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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the persistence of the Post-
Earnings-Announcement Drift (PEAD) over the crisis and post-crisis years. Using 
the period from 2008 to 2017 as a sample, I will analyze the impact produced on 
the PEAD by the financial instability due to Financial Crisis and consequential 
Debt Crisis in the Eurozone. 
Based on the results of statistical regressions, I conclude that the 
phenomenon continues to exist. However, there are some discrepancies in 
magnitude variation whether you consider the Global Financial Crisis (late 2008) 
or the Eurozone Financial Crisis (late 2009) as the starting date for the recession. 
My results indicate that the crisis period from late 2009 onwards provides much 
higher returns which are less explained by any of the risk factors compared to the 
crisis period starting on October 2008. 
Additionally, excluding negative EPS implies attenuation of PEAD 
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The concept that prices fully reflect all available information, known as the 
Efficient Market Theory (Fama, 1970) has been and continues to be subject to a 
variety of challenges in financial markets. According to Thaler (1999), five areas 
which contradict main financial theories can be identified. Among them are 
volume, volatility, cash dividends, the equity premium puzzle and predictability. 
In this study, I will focus exclusively on the last anomaly since it includes one of 
the most enduring trading strategies, the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
(PEAD). 
The PEAD was first discovered by Ball and Brown (1968) and later 
confirmed by Foster, Olsen, & Shevlin, (1984), Bernard & Thomson (1989) and 
others. The strategy states a positive relation between earnings surprise and 
subsequent abnormal returns. The larger part of profits is concentrated on a 
holding period of about 3 months. However, there is also evidence for longer 
holding periods, i.e. for a holding period of 6 months (Bernard & Thomas, 1989). 
Francis (2007) concluded that a great part of abnormal returns is derived 
from securities with high informational uncertainty. He also shows that this is one 
of the predominant characteristics of securities concentrated in the extreme 
portfolios ranked by the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). This brings 
into question the performance of trading strategies in general and in particular of 
the PEAD in an environment of financial stress. Hokkio and Keton (2009) 
characterize financial crisis periods as times of increased uncertainty regarding 
the fundamental value of assets, as well as the behavior of other investors and 
informational asymmetries. The combination of these factors impacts the volatility 
of financial assets. 
The main goal of my investigation is to analyze a strategy based on the 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and how it is affected by unstable 
financial and economic environments. This study extends an already wide range 
of literature which examined the PEAD over different time frames and a variety 
of financial markets (i.e. PEAD in the UK by Liu, Strong, & Xu, 2003; Spain by 
Forner., Sanabria, & Marhuenda, 2009; Greece by Forbes, & Giannopoulos, 
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2015; international by Griffin, Kelly, & Nardari, 2006 and by Hung, Li, & Wang, 
2014). 
My investigation contributes in four major ways. Firstly, it provides a recent 
analysis over the period from 2008 to 2017 of a selection of Eurozone financial 
markets. The choice to focus the analysis on Eurozone markets was motivated 
by a lack of empirical studies on the PEAD for these countries for the post global 
financial crisis period. The second contribution of my study is to select a period 
of crisis and provide a deeper understanding of its effects on one of the most 
persistent financial market anomalies, as the inception of the crisis can be defined 
as starting either in September 2008 (the beginning of the global financial crisis) 
or in October 2009. The later date was obtained from Ahmad, Sehgal, & 
Bhanumurthy, (2013) investigation on the Eurozone crisis and BRIICKS stock 
markets. The third contribution is that I study the impact of the global financial 
crisis by analyzing the data in two different time frames, as I recognize two 
possible inception dates for the crisis. As a final contribution, I conduct a 
robustness test which consists of eliminating both negative and approximately 
zero expected EPS. This is justified by the belief that analysts tend to be 
overoptimistic in negative forecasts, which is mainly attributable to reluctance 
(Butler & Saraoglu., 1999).  
Within the scope of my analysis, the PEAD strategy is statistically significant 
up until a very recent period (March 2017). Considering the full sample period, 
the results indicate that the shorter the holding period, the higher the annualized 
returns. For a holding period of 12 months it is possible to observe a 6.71% 
annualized return, and 10.22% for a period of 3 months, which is a significant 
increase. The regressions that these results stem from do not account for risk 
factors. However, when those are added, the difference between them increases, 
with the new results being 7.34% versus 10.86% for 12 months and 3 months 
respectively. There is also a significant discrepancy in results when I test the 
PEAD on both inception dates, late 2008 and late 2009.  In the latter, the results 
exhibit a behavior more consistent with the PEAD strategy. Long and Short 
positions are therefore significantly more positive and negative, respectively, 
regardless of the holding period. 
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The remainder of this work is organized as follows: in Section 2, I present a 
literature review regarding the PEAD where I also develop a research question. 
In section 3, I present the data used along the investigation. Then, in section 4, I 
explain the methodology which my investigation has followed. Section 5 is 
subdivided into four sections, where the analysis goes from a general perspective 
to a more detailed one. Finally, section 6 summarizes and describes the main 
conclusions I have obtained from this investigation. I also make suggestions on 
possible improvements and further developments. All the references used on my 
investigation can be found in section 7. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
A positive relationship between Earnings Surprises (ES) in the 
announcement day, and the further developments in stock prices (resulting in 
abnormal returns) known as the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift (PEAD) is 
one of the most enduring anomalies in capital markets.  
This phenomenon, first documented about fifty years ago (Ball & 
Brown,1968; Foster (et al., 1984)), is the subject of a very extensive body of 
literature. Bernard and Thomas (1989) proposed, as a way to measure the PEAD, 
the implementation of a long-short SUE (standardized unexpected earnings) 
investment strategy. It consisted in going long on the stock of firms with 
“good”/positive surprise (fitted in the highest decile) and shorting the firm’s stocks 
that had “bad”/negative surprise (fitted in the lowest decile). More specifically, the 
PEAD is generally defined in the literature above as the persistence of this 
difference between the top and bottom SUE deciles over 60 trading days after 
the quarter’s returns announcement. 
To this day, no consensus was found as to the factors that fully explain the 
PEAD phenomenon (Setterberg, 2011). The predominant belief is that investors 
underreact to the information contained in earnings announcements (Bernard 
and Thomas, 1989/1990). This challenges the semi-strong form of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), which states that new obviously publicly 
available information is quickly and fully absorbed by stock prices, and that there 
is almost no possibility for investors to earn abnormal returns.  
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This consequentially led to numerous explanations and replication attempts 
over the years. In recent work, Zhang (2017) identifies three categories in which 
most explanations for the PEAD’s persistence and existence can be grouped. 
The first group is Behavioral, where investors are assumed to have full 
information but are irrational in their behavior. It considers factors related to 
investor’s irrationality being subjected to conservative (under-reaction) and 
representative (overreaction) biases (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Another 
source of investors’ bias can come from their overconfidence and its respective 
changes due to self-attribution making them overreact to private information 
(attributing it too much weight) and under-react to public information (too little 
weight) (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
The second group considers Structural Uncertainty where investors are 
assumed to not have full information but to act rationally. It is mostly related to 
the informativeness of earnings announcements’ content, due to their 
opaqueness and their date availability that lead to increased uncertainty and 
consequentially to a greater PEAD. A higher opaqueness therefore implies a 
higher PEAD, especially when the Book-to-Market ratio is higher (Yan and Zhao, 
2011), and institutional holdings and analyst coverage are lower (Brown and Han, 
2000). Opacity also may lead to divergence in investors’ opinions (Garfinkel and 
Sokobin, 2006) and disagreements among analysts (Kim and Kim, 2003). 
Lastly, Limits of arbitrage constraints (market frictions) are also 
considered, which refer to transaction costs (Ng, Rusticus & Verdi, 2008; Chordia, 
Goyal, Sadka, G., Sadka, R. & Shivakumar, 2009) and arbitrage risks. The former 
refers to costs such as the bid-ask spread and short-sale costs and commissions 
which, according to Chordia (et al. 2009), are responsible for most of the profit 
PEAD’s strategy may provide. The latter one is defined as the unsystematic part 
of stocks’ volatility by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
(2002), and Mendenhall (2004). It consequently constrains investors in fully 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities, more precisely by being bound by the 
respective magnitude the conjunction of these factors creates. 
These categories of factors that explain the PEAD can then be arranged 
according to the following logic: an initial under-reaction, due to behavioral and 
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structural explanations, creates a mispricing which is not afterwards fully 
corrected. 
Despite still being relevant, throughout the last decades, the PEAD lost 
some of its significance, mainly due to exogenous factors that impacted the 
structure of the financial markets over time. Some of these factors are the 
appearance of Algorithmic Trading (AT) in the mid-1990s (associated with 
improved price efficiency, lower bid-ask spreads and sophisticated trading among 
others), the obligation of European countries to adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) from 2005 onwards (i.e. increasing the quality of the 
information contained in reports, as well as making it more transparent and 
comparable), and the economic and financial crisis. 
As Zhang (2017) has shown, the PEAD has been attenuated (especially for 
firms characterized by high investor sophistication, low structural uncertainty, low 
arbitrage risk and low transaction costs). However, it still exists, being statistically 
significant at the 1.90% level, over a period of 60 trading days after earnings 
announcements, even after controlling for a large set of explanatory variables. 
Zhang has also studied the relationship between Algorithmic Trading and the 
PEAD, having concluded that there is no direct statistical relation between an 
increase in the former and an attenuation in the latter. This conclusion was 
achieved after controlling for the effect of decimalization and an increase in 
earnings quality using matched-sampling test procedures. However, indirect 
effects can be found, as AT implies a more efficient incorporation of trading 
signals into prices of stocks due to improved price discovery, but not through the 
improvement in liquidity around the earnings announcement period. 
Regarding the so-called information shock due to the mandatory 
implementation of IFRS, Hung (et al., 2014) showed, by using a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach, that there was a decrease in the PEAD for the 
treatment firms (i.e. affected by the IFRS adoption in 2005). The PEAD decreased 
when the financial reporting changes were greater, and when liquidity, analysts’ 
forecast accuracy, and institutional ownership increased. This highlights the 
greater impact in firms with lower distraction effects, more sophisticated 
investors, lower limits-to-arbitrage, and in countries with a stricter rule of law. 
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Some literature has also indirectly covered the period of the financial crisis 
and observed a significant decrease in the PEAD, especially in 2008, when a 
major financial shock occurred. The shock provoked significant changes in 
individual investors’ perceptions that consequently influenced their own trading 
and risk-taking behaviors (Hoffmann, Post & Pennings 2011). This period is 
characterized by highly uncertain and extremely volatile market conditions, and 
is thus of increased interest for a PEAD analysis, as greater information 
uncertainty provokes even higher investor under-reaction (Zhang, 2006), and is 
also responsible for determining a great part of the PEAD’s magnitude (Gerard, 
2012). 
In this regard, it fits perfectly not only into the first group of explanations but 
also into the second one, as both the investors’ behavior and the reliability of the 
information provided was undermined during financial and later economic crisis 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Martinez-Peria & Tressel, 2015). It is logical to assume that the 
shock associated with financial stress should provide an opposite reaction to the 
exogenous factors mentioned above. Therefore, a greater PEAD should be 
expected during the Crisis Period, when compared with non-crisis periods. All of 
the above leads to the following research questions: 
Does the PEAD remain economically significant considering the Eurozone’s 
financial market as a whole? 
If so, is the impact of the crisis expected to influence its magnitude? 
3. Sample and Data 
The magnitude of the PEAD is affected by numerous characteristics, 
including the firm’s size, with which the PEAD is inversely correlated (Bernard & 
Thomas, 1989). Since my aim is to construct a fully representative sample of the 
Eurozone, and in order to have a sample as realistic as possible, I decided to use 
companies listed on the main stock market indexes of each country’s Stock 
Exchange. However, I only included countries which became part of Eurozone 
before 2006. This choice is justified by several factors. The first, is the need to 
account for a one year implementation lag related to the IFRS. Then, I split the 
period in order to obtain crisis and post-crisis subperiods. Thus, the indexes used 
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were: WBI - Wiener Börse Index for Austria (AT), Bel All-Shares for Belgium 
(BE), OMX for Finland (FI), The CAC All-Tradable index for France (FR), CDAX 
for Germany (DE), Athex All Shares for Greece (GR), AEX All Shares for 
Netherland (NL), PSI All Shares for Portugal (PT), ISEQ Overall Index for 
Ireland (IE) and Madrid Se General for Spain (ES). The only country missing is 
Italy (IT) for which a list of FTSE MIB and/or FTSE Italia All Shares constituents 
was not available on Datastream. Table 1 provides an overview of an average 
country contribution in each quarterly sample. 
Table 1. Average number of companies by country per quarterly sample 
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE NL PT 
55 44 470 87 114 187 163 39 88 41 
My analysis covers the period from October 1st, 2008 to the March 31st, 
2017. There are two main reasons to start the sample in 2008. First, it was in 
September of 2008 that the Lehman Brothers default occurred leading to a 
tremendous mark on global financial markets. This parallels the Eurozone market 
by the difference in volatility of sovereign CDS spreads before and after this 
specific date (Gündüz & Kaya, 2014). Secondly, choosing this time frame allows 
me to analyze and compare two four year periods during and after the global 
financial and economic crisis throughout the Eurozone. 
Companies from financial services were excluded, in line with common 
practice from previous quantitative investigation, and due to the different 
interpretation that their higher than normal leverage levels could bring (Fama and 
French, 1992)1. The way I filter companies out from financial services is by using 
an ICBIN code which identifies the industry to which a company belongs. This 
roughly corresponds to a cut of 263 companies from financial sectors, making 
each quarterly sample contain about 1313 companies before checking the data 
availability. 
In each quarterly sample I only include companies which have reported their 
Earnings Announcements during the calendar earnings announcements period2. 
                                                          
1 Higher leverage for non-financial firms usually serves as indication of distress, where the same 
interpretation doesn’t necessarily apply to financial firms due to its normality. 
 
2 Q1 (01-01 to 31-03); Q2 (01-04 to 30-06); Q3 (01-07 to 30-09); Q4 (01-10 to 31-12). 
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This choice is justified by the need to overcome look-ahead bias while formulating 
portfolios, so that it is possible to replicate them on real markets. 
It is important to highlight that in order for a company to be included in my 
quarterly sample it should have data available for each of 3 main variables (Actual 
EPS report date, EPS Actual, EPS Estimated); otherwise it would be excluded as 
it won’t be possible to calculate the SUE. On each quarterly sample a cut of 2% 
on both top and bottom of the SUE was applied, which corresponds to an average 
cut of 14 companies so as to exclude outliers. 
 
Table 2. Average number of companies by industry3 per quarterly sample 
BM CG CS F HC I OG TN TC U 
111 229 198 263 106 362 46 204 19 38 
All the requirements mentioned above lead to a drastic decrease in the 
quarterly sample. On average, each portfolio separately has about 30 companies 
from an average of 308 companies per quarterly sample. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics regarding the two fundamental variables used in my 
investigation. And in Table 3 I present descriptive statistics regarding a variable 
criteria on which the whole investigation is based on, the SUE. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the two fundamental variables (Analysts’ Mean EPS Estimates 
and Reported EPS). Q1 2008 – Q4 2016 
 
 
                                                          
3 BM - Basic Materials, CG - Consumer Goods, CS - Consumer Services, F - Financials, HC - Health Care,  
I - Industrials, OG - Oil & Gas, TN - Technology, TC - Telecommunications, U - Utilities  













1st D. 1060 0,31 0,06 2,20 127,54 8,30 
10th D. 1060 0,25 0,11 1,37 203,40 7,27 






st D. 1060 -0,09 -0,03 1,76 166,11 0,44 
10th D. 1060 0,50 0,22 1,54 136,97 7,59 
Full S. 10617 0,40 0,21 1,70 549,33 18,00 
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The data for each firm and the Euro Area capital market as a whole, 
aggregates4 I/B/E/S Earnings Per Share (EPS) Estimates and Actually Reported, 
the quarterly earnings announcements dates from 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2016 and 
adjusted prices for each company 20 days prior to the EPS report date. The data 
source for I/B/E/S was the Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
For the purpose of measuring performance, I use monthly net returns for 
each firm in a sample – using monthly variations of a Datastream Datatype called 
Index Return. I use the 3M German Bond Bid Yield5 as a proxy for risk-free rate 
in the European market. 
To construct the three factors from the Fama-French model, I use the 
Market Values of each company at the end of the previous year (t-1) and MTBV 
(Market-to-Book Values) for each company at the end of the previous year (t-1), 
using Datastream in both cases. 
4. Methodology 
In this section I describe the overall procedure from decile ranking measures 
of ES to the formulation of portfolios. 
4.1. Test structure 
The methodology used in my investigation closely follows the test design 
presented in Setterberg’s study (2011), which is consistent with Bernard and 
Thomas (1989). It consists of implementing an investment/trading strategy based 
on quarterly earnings announcements, or, more precisely, on the Earnings 
                                                          
4Data for the first three bullets were obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The rest of them were 
obtained from Datastream. 
 
5 Later the rate of 3M German Bond Bid Yield was rearranged into a monthly rate using the following 
expression: 1𝑀 = (1 + 3𝑀)1 3⁄ − 1. 
 

















1st D. 1060 -2,779 -1,973 2,546 16,954 -3,447 
10th D. 1060 1,564 1,331 0,929 7,931 2,291 
Full S. 10617 -0,163 0,000 1,389 45,132 -4,307 
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Surprises (ES)6, as previously mentioned in the Literature Review section. The 
Earnings Surprise represents the unknown market earnings which, in turn, is 
reflected in the respective stock prices. ES is measured as the difference 
between Actual EPS and Analyst Estimated EPS Consensus, which will be 
explained in more detail in the variable description section ahead. 
The procedure is organized as follows: at the end of each calendar-quarter, 
the firms’ reported EA during the previous 3 months were grouped into a sample 
quarter. Firms included in that sample were ranked according to their unexpected 
earnings scaled by the respective stock prices 20 trading days prior to the report 
date. I control for outliers by cutting 2% of the firms in the lowest and the highest 
SUE (4% from the total sample). This led to an average loss of 14 companies per 
quarter sample. 
Based on those scaled rankings, firms are allocated into one of two 
portfolios. The first portfolio includes firms fitted in the lowest decile of SUE on 
which we take a short position, as it represents “bad news”. The second portfolio 
is comprised of firms included in the highest decile on which we take a long 
position, as it represents “good news”.  
A third portfolio is constructed based on the difference between the first and 
second portfolios, which corresponds to the long-short hedge portfolio – 
arbitrage-based results of PEAD. 
Then, returns for each of the portfolios are measured from the first day of 
the subsequent calendar-quarter for 60 trading days afterwards (approximately 3 
months) as it is during this time range that 80% of Abnormal Returns occur 
(Foster et al., 1984). As I am also interested in a long-term performance 
comparison, I will measure the returns in a 12-month period as well. 
4.2. Variable Description 
In this section I describe all variables used during the process of measuring 
the PEAD. 
                                                          
6 “Unexpected Earnings” and “Earnings Surprise” are used as equivalent terms in this work. 
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4.2.1. Measure of Earnings Surprise 
According to previous literature on this topic, ES can be measured in two 
ways due to two different measures of the market’s expectation component in the 
equation below. These are the time-series approach (e.g., Foster et al., 1984; 
Bernard and Thomas, 1989) and analysts’ consensus (e.g., Liu et al., 2003; 
Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006). I decided to use the analysts’ consensus approach 
as it provides the drift that is not only more significant (about 30%) but also 
consistently larger (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006). Also, the magnitude of the 
eventual drift is of prime interest for this investigation as it allows for an easier 
assessment. 
The SUE can be expressed by the following equation: 
𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 =  
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 − 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒒,𝒚
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒒,𝒚
 ( 1 ) 
Where 𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 represents Standardized Unexpected Earnings for a firm 𝒊 
in the specific quarter 𝒒 (where 𝒒 ∈ {1,2,3,4}) and in a certain year 𝒚 (where 𝒚 ∈ 
{2008, 2009, … , 2016}). 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 is the reported Earnings Per Share. 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 is the analysts’ mean estimate of EPS for each quarter 
earnings announcement at the report date. 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒒,𝒚 is the stock price of the 
respective firm 𝒊 20 days before the announcement. This gap captures the time 
frame where expectations for the announcement still aren’t incorporated into 
prices (Francis et al., 2007). An additional reason to use prices 20 days prior is 
that it enables us to overcome inconsistencies in report dates. Concerns 
regarding accuracy and consistency of those dates are discussed in the study of 
reliability of I/B/E/S earnings announcement dates by Acker and Duck (2009). 
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4.2.2. Measures of Returns 
In this investigation I decided to assume an investor perspective. Thus, for 
the purposes of return measurements I use the Buy-and-Hold Return (BHAR) 
measure as it more closely mimics investors’ experience (Barber and Lyon, 
1997). 
To measure monthly stock performance, I use the Index Return Datastream 
datatype, which is equivalent to the Net Returns when computed in a monthly 
variation mode. 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕  =  
𝑹𝑰𝒕−𝑹𝑰𝒕−𝟏
𝑹𝑰𝒕−𝟏
   ( 2 ) 
Where the return Index can be expressed as following: 
𝑹𝑰𝒕 =  𝑹𝑰𝒕−𝟏 ×
 𝑷𝒕
𝑷𝒕−𝟏
 ( 3 ) 
However, instead of gathering 𝑹𝑰𝒕 and 𝑷𝒕 for each company, I used the 
(PCH#(X(RI), 1M) formula directly on Datastream. 
𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕 
( 4 ) 
Where 𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 stands for an abnormal return in month 𝒕 for a firm 𝒊.’s stock 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 is a monthly return in month 𝒕 for firm 𝒊.’s stock. 𝑹𝒎𝒕 represents the Eurozone 
Market return in month 𝒕, which corresponds to a value-weighted monthly return 
of the all equities traded on the main Eurozone Exchanges. 




( 5 ) 
Where 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝑻 represents the firm 𝒊’s buy-and-hold return for the holding 
period of up to 𝑻 months (where 𝑻 ∈ {1,2, …,12}) and 𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 stands for an abnormal 







     {
𝒑
𝑳
, 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝑳𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝒑
𝑺
, 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕  𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
 ( 6 ) 
Where 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑻 represents an equally-weighted buy-and-hold return of 
portfolio 𝒑 for a holding period of 𝑻 months (where 𝑻 ∈ {1,2, …,12}) with a 
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formation date 𝒇 (where 𝒇 ∈ {1,2, …,34}). 𝑓 = 1 corresponds to portfolios formed 
on the first day of the calendar quarter Q1 2008 where companies which reported 
during the whole Q4 2007 are included. The same logic extends to the rest of the 
34 formation dates, where 𝑓 = 34 corresponds to portfolios formed at the first day 
of the calendar Q4 2017. There are two types of portfolios: 𝒑𝑺 = 1 (Short) and 𝒑𝑳= 
10 (Long). Number one and ten demonstrate the lowest and the highest deciles 
respectively. Intermediate deciles/portfolios were omitted as they were not 
necessary for the purposes of my investigation. Hedge portfolio refers to the 
position where a portfolio with a long position on companies is financed by a 
portfolio with a short position on companies, both positions being taken 
simultaneously. 𝑵 stands for the number of firms fitted in the respective portfolio. 
4.3. Calendar-time regression 
As my investigation is focused on longer periods of performance evaluation 
of stock prices (monthly, over an 8-year period), the calendar-time approach is 
the most adequate. In this section I once more closely follow the methodology 
used by Setterberg (2011). I run three different regressions to perform an initial 
check on the statistical significance of the data used in this investigation. In the 
next section, I will discuss their results. 
After all the necessary data was obtained, the following transformations 
were performed: first, I computed equally weighted monthly returns for each of 
the portfolio (Long, Short and PEAD) with different formation dates. 






 ( 7 ) 
Where 𝑹𝒑,𝒇,𝒕 represents an equally-weighted portfolio return of a type 𝒑 with 
a formation date 𝒇 at month 𝒕 (where 𝒕 ∈ {1,2, …,12}). 𝑹𝒊,𝒇,𝒕 represents the return 
at month 𝒕 of each individual company included in a respective portfolio with a 
formation date 𝒇. 
Considering the fact that I create portfolios on a quarterly basis, there are 4 
overlapping months in each portfolio. With the previous computations, I obtain 12 
monthly returns for each type of portfolio with a corresponding formation date. 
Vladyslav Nesteruk Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Evidence from 
Euro Area During and After the Financial Crisis 
14 
 
This results in a conjunction of 3×12×4×8,5=1224 observations in total7. Each 
portfolio position accumulates 396 monthly observations. 
I computed a Portfolio Excess Return as the difference between the monthly 
return of a specific portfolio and a risk-free rate for the respective month. This is 
the dependent variable used in each one of three calendar-time regressions 
which will be explained further ahead. 
In the first test, I regressed values obtained from the difference presented 
above on the intercept, where portfolio excess return is slightly proxied to an 
abnormal return. This is done to check whether portfolios’ returns are significantly 
over the risk-free rate, as represented in (8). 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕,𝒇 − 𝑹𝒇𝒕 = 𝜶 +  𝜺 ( 8 ) 
Where 𝑹𝒑,𝒕,𝒇 −  𝑹𝒇𝒕 corresponds to monthly excess return of the portfolio 
with a formation date 𝒇 at month 𝒕 over the 𝑹𝒇𝒕 – risk-free rate proxied by the 3M 
German Bond Bid Yield converted into a monthly rate. 𝜶 corresponds to a 
intercept. In the case of PEAD, a hedged position corresponds to the difference 
between Long and Short monthly returns, instead of excess return over risk-free 
rate. These are the same definitions I use for the two other regressions. 
The second regression (9) serves as a way to measure statistical 
significance of the risk factor described in the CAPM Regression by William 
Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965), regressing portfolio excess returns over 
the market excess returns. 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕,𝒇 − 𝑹𝒇𝒕 = 𝜶
𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒎 + 𝜷𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒎 × 𝑹𝑴𝑹𝑭𝒕 + 𝜺
𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒎 ( 9 ) 
Where the dependent variable is the same as used in (6). 𝑹𝑴𝑹𝑭𝒕 
corresponds to a market excess return measured as the difference between 𝑹𝒎𝒕 
– a monthly return of the Eurozone Market and a risk-free rate – 𝑹𝒇𝒕. 
                                                          
7 Values used in this computation are 3 Positions (Long, Short and a Hedge) × 12 Months of Holding Periods 
× 4 Quarters per year × 8.5 Years. The odd number of years is justified by the fact that I form portfolios on 
a quarterly basis. Thus, using formation quarters from Q1 2008 through Q4 2016 and making the most 
common end of the shortest holding period under my analysis (3M) for the last sample quarter implies 
cutting the holding period after 3 months. This was done to guarantee that the period under analysis is 
always the same. 
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Finally, I use a three-factor regression described by Fama and French 
(1993). Besides the risk factor used in regression (7), two more factors are added 
here: 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕,𝒇 −  𝑹𝒇𝒕 = 𝒂
𝟑𝑭 +  𝒃𝟑𝑭 × 𝑹𝑴𝑹𝑭𝒕 + 𝒔
𝟑𝑭 × 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝒉
𝟑𝑭 × 𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 + 𝜺
𝟑𝑭 ( 10 ) 
The data available from Fama and French8 does not provide does not 
provide the most adequate data for the Eurozone, only for Europe as a whole. 
Thus, the lack of data when running the last regression led me to create a 
database from scratch, based mainly on the methodology described by Fama 
and French (1993). 
The sample is a conjunction of nearly all listed companies on the main Stock 
Exchanges of each country. It is also important to highlight that the countries 
included in my Eurozone sample are just the ones which adopted the euro before 
2006. I also used this sample to compute a monthly value-weighted returns as a 
proxy for the Eurozone Market returns (Rm). The only difference to Rm is that, 
for 3-Factors data, I discard the companies which had a negative Book-to-Market 
ratio. The table below shows the average number of companies by industries 
present in the sample. 
Table 5. Average number of companies by industry9 per quarterly sample 
BM CG CS F HC I OG TN TC U 
102 212 185 243 100 341 41 201 18 35 
For each company I collect Market Values December 31st of t-1 of each 
year from 2007 to 2017, using Market Value (MV) datatype in Datastream. This 
is the metric/data preferred by Fama-French (1993) which is the product of the 
number of ordinary shares in issue by its corresponding share price. Another key 
data for Fama-French model is Book-to-Market Value (BTMV). I computed it by 
dividing one over Market-to-Book Value (MTBV), which I collect on December 
31st of t-1 of each year from 2007 to 2017. The latter is defined as the market 
                                                          
8 Link Kenneth R. French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu 
 
9 BM - Basic Materials, CG - Consumer Goods, CS - Consumer Services, F - Financials, HC - Health Care,  
    I - Industrials, OG - Oil & Gas, T - Technology, T - Telecommunications, U - Utilities  
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value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the balance sheet value of the 
ordinary (common) equity in the company (Worldscope item 03501). 
The computations behind the SMB and HML are as follows: first, each year, 
in June, the median value was computed based on the market value for all 
companies, so as to divide the list of constituents into big and small groups. 
Secondly, inside each group I created 3 separate portfolios using 30% and 70% 
as breakpoints over the Book-to-Market Values among the companies. With 
these computations I constructed 6 portfolios: SL (Small MV and Low BTMV), 
SM, SH, BL, BM, and for BH (Big MV and High BTMV). Each of them provides 
monthly returns for up to 12 months (June(t) to May (t+1)). 
Now having 6 portfolios with 12 monthly returns each, I computed the two 
main metrics that are used in the last Regression: 
➢ SMB (Small minus Big) – corresponds to the risk factor an investor faces 
regarding the firm’s size, as it’s assumed that companies with small 
capitalization usually generate higher returns, but at the cost of higher risk, 
compared to companies with larger capitalization. This is the difference 
between average monthly returns of three Small portfolios and three Big 
portfolios. 
𝑹𝑺𝑴𝑩 =
𝑹𝑺𝑳 + 𝑹𝑺𝑴 + 𝑹𝑺𝑯
𝟑
−
𝑹𝑩𝑳 + 𝑹𝑩𝑴 + 𝑹𝑩𝑯
𝟑
 ( 11 ) 
 
➢ HML (High minus Low) – corresponds to a risk factor related to the excess 
return of value stocks (companies with high Book-to-Market Value – BTMV) 
over the growth stocks (with low BTMV). It is the difference between 
average monthly returns of two portfolios, one Small and one Big. Both the 
small and big portfolios are themselves constituted by a High BTMV and a 







 ( 12 ) 
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Above all, I would like to start my explanation of the results by showing, in 
general terms, abnormal returns generated by each formation quarter with a 
hedged position held over 12 months. I will then extend my analysis providing 
more details by testing this strategy on statistical significance against risk factors. 
Figure 1. demonstrates that if a PEAD position is held for 12 months it 
generates positive returns in 29 cases and only 7 formation quarters resulted in 
negative returns. A simple average of Buy-and-Hold Returns results in about 
4,96% annualized. From the graph we can also observe that Q1, Q4 2008 and 
Q1 2009 generated the most negative returns along the sample, which precisely 
coincides with the starting period of the global financial crisis. 
  
Figure 1. Buy-and-Hold Returns from the 12 months holding period of PEAD positions 
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Table 6. Average monthly rate of return (%) by decile and SUE (%) by decile 
Decile Av. Monthly Rate Av. SUE Annualized Rate 
1 short 0,851*** -2,865*** 10,700 
2 1,044*** -0,882*** 13,270 
3 1,109*** -0,409*** 14,151 
4 1,166*** -0,189*** 14,926 
5 1,197*** -0,063*** 15,347 
6 1,792** 0,033*** 23,756 
7 1,144*** 0,144*** 14,630 
8 1,148*** 0,301*** 14,675 
9 1,252*** 0,61*** 16,106 
10 long 1,394*** 1,587*** 18,066 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. Deciles are sorted in ascending order by SUE. 
Table 6. shows that each decile provides a hypothetical positive return 
which is statistically significant. From this we can conclude that even the lowest 
decile generates positive returns. However, the difference between the highest 
(10th) and the lowest (1st) deciles remains positive, and the hedge position results 
in a monthly return rate of about 0.54% and 6.71% on an annual basis. 
As the next step in trying to understand the impact of crisis, I would suggest 
reviewing the results by diving the sample into two periods, during and after the 
crisis. 
Table 7. Results from calendar-time regressions over monthly returns up to 12 months of a holding period 
for three positions (Long, Short, PEAD). Full sample period between October 2008 – March 2017. 
   Crisis   Post-Crisis   Full Period 
Variable Long Short PEAD   Long Short PEAD   Long Short PEAD 
intercept 0,007 0,003 0,005*  0,020*** 0,014*** 0,006***  0,014*** 0,008*** 0,005*** 
t-stat (1.47) (0.50) (1.86)  (6.50) (4.22) (3.19)  (4.63) (2.61) (3.43) 
p-value (0.143) (0.618) (0.064)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
 
           
N 204 204 204  204 204 204  408 408 408 
Adj. R2 0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. Long represents a long position in the highest SUE decile, Short represents a short position 
in the lowest SUE decile and PEAD represent a hedge position where the returns from a short 
position are subtracted from a long position. 
Looking at Table 7, we may conclude that the PEAD persists over eight years 
up until recently (March 2017). An average monthly return of 0.54% is statistically 
significant at the level of 1%, considering the full sample and a holding period of 
12 months. We can also see from Table 7, that most of the return comes from the 
long position (1.36%/month) and that the hedge position is partially jeopardized 
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by the short position since it provides positive returns (0.82%/month) which are 
significant at the same 1% level. 
When comparing two periods, we may notice that the PEAD is only 
significant at a 10% level during the crisis period. In this case, the PEAD provides 
an average 0.47% return rate which, when annualized, amounts to 5.75%. I would 
also like to emphasize the fact that during the crisis both long and short positions 
are not statistically significant. 
5.1. PEAD vs. CAPM 
So far, I have tested the statistical significance of long, short and combined 
portfolios using univariate regressions, without taking into consideration any risk 
factors. Thus, I add a market risk factor into the regression as a possible 
explanation for those abnormal returns, following the CAPM. 
Table 8. Results from calendar-time regressions with a market risk factor over monthly returns up to 
12 months of a holding period for three positions (Long, Short, PEAD). Full sample period between 
October 2008 – March 2017. 
  Crisis   Post-Crisis   Full Period 
Variable Long Short PEAD   Long Short PEAD   Long Short PEAD 
intercept 0,005** 0,000 0,005*  0,009*** 0,003 0,006***  0,007*** 0,002 0,006*** 
t-stat (2,06) (-0,04) (1,88)  (5,16) (1,43) (3,04)  (4,92) (0,83) (3,45) 
p-value (0,040) (0,965) (0,062)  (0,000) (0,155) (0,003)  (0,000) (0,408) (0,001) 
RMRF 0,905*** 0,923*** -0,018  0,930*** 0,927*** 0,002  0,914*** 0,926*** -0,012 
t-stat (28,61) (22,99) (-0,51)  (21,36) (17,88) (0,05)  (37,18) (30,45) (-0,45) 
p-value (0,000) (0,000) (0,607)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,962)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,655) 
            
N 204 204 204  204 204 204  408 408 408 
Adj. R2 0,801 0,722 -0,004   0,692 0,611 -0,005   0,772 0,695 -0,002 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. Long represents a long position in the highest SUE decile, Short represents a short position 
in the lowest SUE decile and PEAD represent a hedge position where the returns from a 
short position are subtracted from a long position. 
Results from Table 8 indicate that market risk factor can’t explain abnormal 
returns. The coefficient of the risk factor is not statistically significant neither when 
considering a full sample period nor when analyzed in two separate periods. 
It is also noticeable that the returns of both long and short positions 
decreased in magnitude. However, this decrease was slightly disproportionate 
since the PEAD magnitude turned out marginally higher compared to the PEAD 
without a market risk factor. Also, comparing the PEAD among three time frames 
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we see that the monthly return is concentrated around 0.5%. This provides 
annualized returns of 5.82% during the crisis, 7.65% post-crisis and 6.83% 
considering the whole sample. The last two are at 1% significance level, while the 
first one is significant at a 10% level. 
5.2. PEAD vs. Fama-French 3 Factors 
In addition to the market risk factor, the Fama-French Model suggests 
including size and value risk factors in order to test the significance of a portfolio. 
This way, it makes an adjustment for additional risk factors proxied by size and 
value. 
In this subsection I provide results differently from the previous two tables. 
Since it is the most extensive model used in my investigation, I divide this analysis 
into three panels which differ by the time frames used. Each one contains results 
from 3 factor regressions over four holding periods. Later ones range from 12 
months to a minimum of 3 months holding periods. Thus, I show performances 
for both long- and short-term investments. 
According to results in Panel A, after adding 3 risk factors from the Fama-
French Model to the simple regression, PEAD continues to be significant at 1% 
although partially explained by size and value risks when holding portfolio for 12 
months. It provides 7.34% returns on an annual basis. However, the PEAD on 
the shortest period demonstrates much better results in terms of performance, 
and isn’t explained by any of the factors included. 
Panel A. also confirms a “hedged position” of PEAD since there is a 
statistically significant high and positive correlation of over 98% with the market 
for both long and short positions considered separately. Nonetheless, this 
correlation is very close to zero and insignificant when a joint portfolio is 
considered. Once again, the major part of returns, with a holding period of 12 
months, is from a Long position providing 7.30% vs. -0.03% from a Short position, 
both annualized. The holding period of 6 months can be characterized as having 
highest returns, with an 11.39% annualized return, but at the same time it is the 
riskiest one. Market risk factor is statistically significant at a 5% significance level, 
explaining such an abnormal return. However, the return for the holding period of 
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3 months is just slightly lower (10.86%), and is not explained by any factors, 
where the long position contributes 9.52%, and the short position produces -
1.21% on an annual basis. 
Panel A. also indicates that, over longer holding periods, size effects 
accentuate jointly with value risk, while, at the same time market risk decreases. 
Panel B.  demonstrates the results from the crisis period after the full sample 
is separated into two periods with a breakpoint at the end of the Eurozone crisis. 
Panel C. shows a post-crisis period. I did it with the purpose of better 
understanding the impact which the crisis had on the PEAD’s performance. 
These two tables should be analyzed in conjunction. 
One of the most noticeable differences between the two outputs is that 
results of PEAD from Panel C. are statistically significant and not explained by 
any of the risk factors, since none of them is statistically significant in the post-
crisis period. The average monthly return during the period of crisis is 0.48% 
(5.90% annualized) versus 0.65% (8.08% annualized) after December 2012. This 
suggests that the effect of an unstable period of time implies an attenuation of 
the PEAD’s magnitude. However, to clarify this affirmation I elaborate an 
additional analysis where the inception date is shifted to the latter months of 2009 
(November), closer to the actual Eurozone Crisis. 
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Table 9. Results from calendar-time Regression 3 over monthly returns for 12, 9, 6 and 3 months of a holding period for three positions. 
Panel A: October 2008 – March 2017 
    Long   Short   PEAD 
    12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
intercept  0,006*** 0,007*** 0,008*** 0,008***  0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001  0,006*** 0,008*** 0,009*** 0,009*** 
t-stat  (4,43) (4,27) (4,24) (2,88)  (-0,02) (-0,47) (-0,54) (-0,32)  (3,70) (3,97) (4,19) (2,90) 
p-value  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,005)  (0,986) (0,637) (0,593) (0,749)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,005) 
RMRF  0,986*** 0,989*** 0,991*** 1,028***  1,019*** 1,069*** 1,108*** 1,089***  -0,034 -0,080* -0,117** -0,061 
t-stat  (31,85) (27,31) (22,96) (16,73)  (27,78) (25,30) (21,97) (14,77)  (-0,90) (-1,83) (-2,33) (-0,88) 
p-value  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,367) (0,069) (0,021) (0,383) 
SMB  0,354*** 0,338*** 0,378*** 0,452***  0,514*** 0,514*** 0,485*** 0,480***  -0,160*** -0,175*** -0,107 -0,029 
t-stat  (7,42) (6,06) (5,68) (4,77)  (9,09) (7,89) (6,24) (4,23)  (-2,79) (-2,59) (-1,38) (-0,27) 
p-value  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,006) (0,010) (0,168) (0,788) 
HML  0,170*** 0,167*** 0,179*** 0,192***  0,279*** 0,224*** 0,196*** 0,242***  -0,109** -0,057 -0,017 -0,051 
t-stat  (4,66) (3,92) (3,53) (2,64)  (6,45) (4,51) (3,30) (2,78)  (-2,48) (-1,10) (-0,28) (-0,62) 
p-value  (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,010)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,006)  (0,014) (0,272) (0,776) (0,538) 
                
N  408 306 204 102  408 306 204 102  408 306 204 102 
Adj. R2   0,805 0,803 0,810 0,815   0,760 0,770 0,791 0,780   0,024 0,018 0,019 -0,008 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. Long represents a long position in the highest SUE decile, Short represents a short position in the lowest SUE decile and PEAD represent a hedge position 
where the returns from a short position are subtracted from a long position. Three regressions were run on each position. The first regression is a mere 
proxy to measure the significance of an excess return. The second regression is a CAPM model which measures the relationship of excess returns 
expected from the position in case with a systematic risk. The third regression adds two more risk factors (from the Fama-French model) to the market 
risk factor (CAPM), the size and the value risks. 
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Panel B: October 2008 – December 2012 
    Long   Short   PEAD 
    12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
intercept  0,005** 0,005** 0,007** 0,007  0,000 -0,001 0,000 -0,001  0,005* 0,006* 0,007** 0,007 
t-stat  (2,10) (1,99) (2,15) (1,51)  (-0,12) (-0,19) (-0,11) (-0,13)  (1,94) (1,89) (2,01) (1,60) 
RMRF  0,940*** 0,941*** 0,954*** 1,018***  0,983*** 1,051*** 1,086*** 1,033***  -0,043 -0,110* -0,133* -0,015 
t-stat  (23,08) (19,48) (16,06) (12,07)  (20,19) (18,64) (15,83) (10,35)  (-0,91) (-1,95) (-1,97) (-0,17) 
SMB  0,294*** 0,269*** 0,352*** 0,478***  0,530*** 0,548*** 0,501*** 0,471***  -0,236*** -0,280*** -0,150 0,007 
t-stat  (4,15) (3,20) (3,41) (3,26)  (6,26) (5,60) (4,21) (2,72)  (-2,88) (-2,85) (-1,28) (0,05) 
HML  0,176*** 0,163*** 0,209*** 0,254**  0,326*** 0,275*** 0,244*** 0,299**  -0,150** -0,113 -0,034 -0,044 
t-stat  (3,37) (2,63) (2,76) (2,36)  (5,23) (3,82) (2,78) (2,34)  (-2,49) (-1,56) (-0,40) (-0,39)                 
N  204 153 102 51  204 153 102 51  204 153 102 51 
Adj. R2   0,819 0,812 0,813 0,827   0,775 0,788 0,801 0,785   0,039 0,045 0,020 -0,053 
                
Panel C: January 2013 – March 2017 
    Long   Short   PEAD 
    12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M   12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
intercept  0,005*** 0,006*** 0,007*** 0,008**  -0,001 -0,002 -0,003 -0,004  0,007*** 0,008*** 0,011*** 0,012*** 
t-stat  (3,15) (3,30) (3,41) (2,48)  (-0,67) (-0,93) (-1,28) (-1,08)  (2,97) (3,32) (3,91) (2,85) 
RMRF  1,149*** 1,148*** 1,138*** 1,102***  1,156*** 1,154*** 1,223*** 1,321***  -0,007 -0,005 -0,085 -0,220 
t-stat  (20,82) (18,31) (16,08) (10,61)  (17,68) (15,33) (14,15) (10,25)  (-0,09) (-0,06) (-0,94) (-1,58) 
SMB  0,550*** 0,527*** 0,555*** 0,580***  0,611*** 0,578*** 0,609*** 0,706***  -0,060 -0,051 -0,055 -0,126 
t-stat  (7,00) (5,89) (5,50) (3,92)  (6,55) (5,39) (4,95) (3,84)  (-0,58) (-0,43) (-0,42) (-0,64) 
HML  0,059 0,087 0,017 -0,050  0,147* 0,083 0,024 0,017  -0,088 0,004 -0,008 -0,067 
t-stat  (0,87) (1,13) (0,19) (-0,39)  (1,81) (0,89) (0,22) (0,11)  (-0,97) (0,04) (-0,07) (-0,39) 
                
N  204 153 102 51  204 153 102 51  204 153 102 51 
Adj. R2   0,772 0,783 0,798 0,764   0,716 0,711 0,752 0,757   -0,003 -0,018 -0,017 0,033 
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5.3. Additional Analysis 
Reviewing the literature regarding the Eurozone crisis I found two dates 
used as the inception of the crisis. First, the date at which Lehman Brothers 
defaulted marks an inception of a global financial crisis around September 2008. 
Secondly, according to Ahmad (et al., 2013) the financial contagion effects of 
various financial markets including GIPSI10, which is highly interesting since 
those are the countries where the Eurozone crisis originated in October 2009, 
and which suffered the most from the crisis. 
Table 8 shows results from regressions with 3 risk factors for four different 
holding periods using November of 2009 as the first month of the crisis period. 
The holding period of 12 months means that I include 12 individual monthly 
returns after the formation of the portfolio. The same logic applies to other holding 
periods. 
Comparing the crisis period results from Table 8 to the results of PEAD 
column from Panel B we can observe that the magnitude expands significantly 
when we consider late 2009 as the inception of the crisis in Eurozone. From Panel 
B we can also see that after the crisis, regardless of the holding period, the PEAD 
is always statistically significant at the 1% level and none of the market risk 
factors, size or value can explain abnormal PEAD returns.  Accentuation of the 
last two risk factors and attenuation of the market risk factor continues to occur 
in case of a longer holding period. 
                                                          
10 GIPSI states for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
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Table 10. Results from calendar-time Regression 3 over monthly returns for 12, 9, 6 and 3 months holding period for the hedge position (PEAD) for three 










12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
 
12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
 
12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
intercept 0,009*** 0,009*** 0,011*** 0,015***  0,007*** 0,008*** 0,011*** 0,012***  0,008*** 0,009*** 0,011*** 0,012*** 
t-stat (3,77) (3,22) (3,36) (3,89)  (2,97) (3,32) (3,91) (2,85)  (5,13) (5,06) (5,56) (4,54) 
p-value (0,000) (0,002) (0,001) (0,000)  (0,003) (0,001) (0,000) (0,007)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
RMRF -0,057 -0,090 -0,167** -0,074  -0,007 -0,005 -0,085 -0,220  -0,047 -0,056 -0,133** -0,143* 
t-stat (-0,96) (-1,25) (-2,05) (-0,78)  (-0,09) (-0,06) (-0,94) (-1,58)  (-1,09) (-1,10) (-2,37) (-1,87) 
p-value (0,336) (0,215) (0,044) (0,439)  (0,926) (0,950) (0,349) (0,121)  (0,278) (0,272) (0,019) (0,065) 
SMB -0,190** -0,195** -0,148 0,055  -0,060 -0,051 -0,055 -0,126  -0,137** -0,117* -0,104 -0,050 
t-stat (-2,39) (-2,01) (-1,35) (0,43)  (-0,58) (-0,43) (-0,42) (-0,64)  (-2,47) (-1,79) (-1,45) (-0,51) 
p-value (0,018) (0,047) (0,180) (0,668)  (0,563) (0,667) (0,672) (0,528)  (0,014) (0,075) (0,149) (0,613) 
HML -0,105* -0,077 -0,032 0,032  -0,088 0,004 -0,008 -0,067  -0,081** -0,039 -0,019 -0,012 
t-stat (-1,85) (-1,11) (-0,41) (0,36)  (-0,97) (0,04) (-0,07) (-0,39)  (-1,99) (-0,80) (-0,36) (-0,17) 
p-value (0,067) (0,269) (0,680) (0,722)  (0,335) (0,968) (0,947) (0,700)  (0,047) (0,422) (0,722) (0,868) 
                   
N 152 114 76 38  204 153 102 51  356 267 178 89 
Adj. R2 0,028 0,018 0,035 -0,047  -0,003 -0,018 -0,017 0,033  0,018 0,003 0,023 0,022 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. In this table the results from the 3-Factors Fama-French model over different time frames and with different holding periods are demonstrated. 
iii. 12M, 9M, 6M and 3M are the different holding periods of implementation for a PEAD investment strategy. For example, the holding period of 12 months 
means that data for a sample includes all individual monthly returns up to 12 months. 
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5.4. Robustness Test 
As previously mentioned, I conducted robustness tests where I filtered out 
negative forecasts of Earnings Per Share, since analysts tend to be overoptimistic 
while making an estimate with a negative sign (Butler et al., 1999). 
In Table 9 I demonstrate the results using a regression with 3 risk factors 
over PEAD. From it we can see that there is some attenuation in magnitude for 
each time frame. However, the period of the crisis starting in late 2009 still 
provides the highest returns which are statistically significant and not explicable 
by any of the risk factors used in the regression. Returns range from 6.39% (an 
annualized monthly return of 0.88%) with a 12 month holding period to 15.48% 
(annualized monthly return of 1.45%) with a 3 month holding period. This means 
that the shorter the period during which the portfolio is held, the higher the return 
on the positions. This, however, implies a more frequent rebalancing of the 
portfolio. Portfolios with such a high rebalancing frequency should be tested 
separately, since a more frequent rebalancing should imply higher transaction 
costs.
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Table 11. Results from calendar-time Regression 3 over monthly returns for 12, 9, 6 and 3 months holding period for the hedge position (PEAD) for three 
time frames excluding Negative and Approximately Zero Estimated EPS. October 2008 / November 2009 – December 2012– March 2017 
 
PEAD 
Crisis (2008)  
PEAD 
Crisis (2009)  
PEAD 
Post-Crisis 
  12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
 
12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
 
12M 9 M 6 M 3 M 
intercept 0,002 0,002 0,004 0,005 
 
0,005** 0,007*** 0,008*** 0,012*** 
 
0,003* 0,005** 0,005** 0,004 
t-stat (0,66) (0,88) (1,21) (1,41) 
 
(2,40) (2,77) (3,07) (3,54) 
 
(1,75) (2,13) (2,00) (1,19) 
RMRF -0,062 -0,087* -0,107* -0,067 
 
0,006 0,002 -0,050 -0,023 
 
0,038 0,018 -0,060 -0,132 
t-stat (-1,47) (-1,67) (-1,74) (-0,96) 
 
(0,10) (0,04) (-0,73) (-0,27) 
 
(0,58) (0,24) (-0,68) (-1,09) 
SMB -0,188** -0,229** -0,125 -0,056 
 
-0,066 -0,113 -0,081 -0,012 
 
-0,089 -0,080 -0,161 -0,268 
t-stat (-2,56) (-2,54) (-1,17) (-0,47) 
 
(-0,90) (-1,31) (-0,88) (-0,10) 
 
(-0,95) (-0,75) (-1,28) (-1,56) 
HML -0,114** -0,108 -0,057 -0,151* 
 
-0,070 -0,079 -0,065 -0,120 
 
-0,006 0,053 0,033 0,077 
t-stat (-2,12) (-1,63) (-0,72) (-1,70) 
 
(-1,34) (-1,30) (-0,99) (-1,45) 
 
(-0,07) (0,57) (0,30) (0,51) 
                   
N 204 153 102 51 
 
152 114 76 38 
 
204 153 102 51 
Adj. R2 0,033 0,036 0,019 0,080  -0,007 -0,006 -0,008 0,040  0,005 -0,006 -0,012 -0,009 
i. Significance levels are ***, **, * at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ii. In this table the results from the 3-Factors Fama-French model over different time frames and with different holding periods are demonstrated. 
iii. 12M, 9M, 6M and 3M are the different holding periods of implementation for a PEAD investment strategy. For example, the holding period of 12 months 
means that data for a sample includes all individual monthly returns up to 12 months. 
iv. Crisis (2008) has as an inception date of October 2008, Crisis (2009) has as an inception date of November 2009. Both periods have December 2012 as 
an end date for the crisis. Post-Crisis refers to the period from January 2013 to March 2017. 
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The main goal of this dissertation was to investigate the impact that the global 
financial and debt crisis had on the performance of the PEAD strategy. The 
sample of this investigation consists of the companies listed on the principal 
indexes of each Eurozone country which had adopted the euro by 2006. This 
specific year is taken into consideration due to the full implementation of IFRS in 
Europe. However, in order to obtain a balanced analysis of the crisis and post-
crisis period, I included data starting from 2008. This way, I was able to provide 
an updated and balanced analysis of two four year periods during and after the 
crisis. 
Analyzing the results from econometrical regressions, I concluded that the 
PEAD strategy not only provides statistically significant returns, but also mitigates 
risk. This conclusion is based on the fact that Long and Short positions when 
taken separately are fully explained by risk factors. The same situation is not 
observable when considering the Hedge Portfolio. 
It is also worth highlighting that the performance of the Hedged Strategy is 
higher and not explained by any of the factors used in the regressions when 
observing the post-crisis period (January 2013 – March 2017). However, the 
same does not happen when the period under analysis is out of the normal 
functioning of financial markets (i.e., disturbances caused by financial stress 
inherent to the financial crisis [Hakkio and Keton, 2009]). 
An additional analysis with a crisis inception date of November 2009, 
indicates an increase in magnitude, while a robustness test that consists in taking 
off negative EPS attenuates this magnitude. Nonetheless, the returns provided 
when this period is considered are still much higher than for other periods. 
As for future research, I would suggest a more specified analysis focusing on 
each country separately. One limitation of this investigation is the use of mean 
EPS analysts’ forecasts. As such, I would also suggest using median analysts’ 
forecasts as the expected EPS. Further developments could also take into 
account other risk factors when testing the PEAD significance, since my 
investigation only provides test with market, size and value risks. 
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